The Shankill Butchers Read online

  There were two other misfits earmarked for special attention by Murphy and Mr A. They had all the necessary characteristics: a hatred of Catholics, a history of crime, and a malleable personality. The first was Edward McIlwaine, who lived at Forthriver Crescent in the Glencairn estate where Murphy created his own dumping ground for bodies. Twenty-two-year-old McIlwaine was a waster who found it difficult to settle in any job. He was a part-time member of the Ulster Defence Regiment, and confided to an associate that his motive for joining the UDR was to fight the IRA, though the more likely explanation was that he needed money plus the social status UDR membership accorded him. The youngest member of the Brown Bear team was William John Townsley who, though only fourteen, was a tough, mature individual. He was to prove a hard nut to crack in later interviews by the police.

  By the end of September 1975 Murphy and Mr A. had put the unit together and believed the time was ripe to begin their own war irrespective of UVF policy. At that time the leadership of the UVF in the Maze believed that the pact with other groupings, which had temporarily broken down, should be reactivated, but in Combat magazine that month someone writing under the pseudonym ‘Activist’ expressed the thinking in circles frequented by Murphy and his gang:

  Assassination: A few illustrations will suffice to drive home these points. One concerns the public outcry over alleged sectarian assassinations. It is alleged by both Loyalist and Republican politicians that both the IRA and the UVF have been engaged in senseless sectarian murder campaigns. They say that the premeditated murder of another person, albeit an enemy soldier, shows a callous disregard for human life. They say that the assassination of a British soldier or an IRA activist is against the rules of civilized and humane warfare. The very same people will, however, calmly call for more soldiers and better equipment to wipe out the terrorists. They will call for the reintroduction of the death penalty for traitors and gunmen and calmly sit down by the trap door as it calmly swings open and sends another soul out into eternity. Now, I ask you what is the difference between the UVF Volunteer’s bullet and the British soldier’s bullet? What is the difference between a UVF man shooting a traitor or a gunman and the prospect of an executioner sitting in Crumlin Road Gaol hanging his victims by the neck until dead? Is the victim of the UVF man any deader than the victim of the British soldier? Is the victim of the hangman any deader than the victim of the gunman? There is no difference whatsoever when a gun is fired or a trapdoor opens, a life is lost and no amount of emotional ravings about the method of execution will change the verdict for the victim. War brings death and destruction and those who originate a war situation, be they politicians or gunmen, must be prepared to accept the fact that there is no humane or civilized way in which to fight that war.

  It was emphasized later in the article that no UVF volunteer took pride in ‘blasting several of his fellow human beings into eternity’ but facts had to be faced: ‘We must fight fire with fire, bomb for bomb, bullet for bullet,’ argued the writer. The magazine also issued a warning to journalists, in particular to the Northern editor of the Irish Times, David McKittrick, who was instructed to temper his comments about the UVF. It accused him of giving the IRA the names of new members of the organization’s Brigade Staff by printing those names in his newspaper, and it threatened that if any of the people named met harm directly or indirectly McKittrick would be ‘treated accordingly’. McKittrick, a fine investigative journalist, was aware in the autumn of 1975 that, in his words, a ‘blood-thirsty’ leadership had taken control of the UVF which was planning a new terror campaign.

  The Brigade Staff called for a ‘Big Push’ for the beginning of October to give notice of their intentions. They were willing to risk such action even in the knowledge that it could lead to a renewal of the ban on the UVF which had been lifted in 1974. The organization preferred to demonstrate a return to traditional terrorist methods though this would force them underground.

  Lenny Murphy received orders to plan ‘something’ for 2 October. The go-ahead was sufficient and he was determined to select his own targets irrespective of plans being drawn up by the leadership. In the last week of September he told his unit that he had chosen his target. It was to be Casey’s Wholesale Wine and Spirits establishment in the Millfield area, between the lower Shankill and Falls on the edge of Belfast city centre. He chose Moore for his driver but assured him that his own taxi would not be used in the operation: a van was to be hijacked on the relevant day. Lenny said that he would lead the operation while two other members – twenty-one-year-old William Arlow Green and his nineteen-year-old brother, Thomas Noel Green – would be used as back-up. Murphy told them all that the motive was robbery. Three members of this special operations unit were detailed to watch the premises for several days to determine how to enter without attracting too much attention. Thomas Noel Green, a van driver, was told not to report for work on the morning of 2 October. He was to meet Murphy, Moore and William Green at Mr A.’s house off the Shankill Road.

  When Murphy and the selected members of his unit met at 8.00 A.M. on 2 October Lenny outlined his plan and told them that a van was at that moment being hijacked in North Belfast for the robbery and the owner would be held until the job was completed. Murphy produced a .45 pistol which he said was for his own use, then handed a .22 pistol to William Arlow Green and a .38 revolver to Moore. The plan was simple in that the spirits store opened early for business and was entered via a gateway which, when opened, would allow the hijacked van to be hidden in the premises until the robbery was completed. Murphy said that if there was trouble the guns would ‘come in handy’ but entry was to be achieved with the least possible effort. The van would be driven into the premises and a member of the team would close the gate behind them. William Arlow Green would tell the staff that he was there for a drinks order. Murphy and the others would then rush out of the van, usher the staff upstairs and demand money.

  Four people were employed in Casey’s: two married sisters, Frances Donnelly aged thirty-five and forty-seven-year-old Marie McGrattan, and two eighteen-year-olds, Gerard Grogan and Thomas Osborne. All were Catholics. Casey’s was owned by a Catholic family and the premises were situated close to the Falls Road; all factors indicating the religious affiliation of the staff. Grogan and Osborne were helpers, selecting and loading drinks orders, while the two sisters conducted business directly with customers. At 10.00 A.M. Murphy and his three associates left Mr A.’s house, got into a hijacked van and headed for Millfield with Thomas Noel Green in the driving seat. In the rear and out of sight lay Murphy, Moore and William Green. Within five minutes the van had reached Casey’s and when it came to a halt Moore got out using the rear doors. He opened the gateway to allow the van in and then closed the gateway to the premises, screening off the vehicle from the roadway. Marie McGrattan was the first person to see the UVF men and asked if they were there for a drinks order. While she was chatting to Moore, Murphy and William Green eased themselves out of the vehicle and Murphy handed her a bogus order for spirits which was crudely written on a scrap of paper. Grogan, hearing the sound of voices, appeared in the yard and stood watching the four men who were facing Marie McGrattan. She suggested that her prospective customers accompany her to an upstairs office and walked ahead towards a staircase. She was followed by William Green and Murphy, who, before ascending the staircase, motioned to Moore to look after Grogan. Noel Green remained alongside the van to facilitate a quick getaway. The events of the fifteen minutes which followed illustrated Murphy’s potential for barbarity. While Murphy made his way to the office, Moore chatted to the two young men in the downstairs storeroom, asking them their names and where they lived. Once inside the upstairs office, Murphy and William Green drew their guns. Marie McGrattan and her sister raised their hands and Murphy demanded to know the whereabouts of the office takings. Marie replied that there was no money on the premises because it was too early in the day to attract custom. Murphy became threatening and asked their names, which they gav
e. He demanded money again, and again was told there was none. At this point he told Green to keep the women covered with his .22 pistol while he searched the office. The search produced nothing and in fury Murphy told the two sisters to get down on their hands and knees on the office floor. He stood over Marie McGrattan, pointed his .45 Colt semi-automatic at her head and indicated to Green to do likewise to Frances Donnelly. Murphy then shot Marie through the back of the head and Green fired his pistol into the head of Frances. Before leaving the office Murphy ripped out the telephone, took the lock off the door and closed it tightly from the outside. As William Green made for the van, Murphy headed for the storeroom. On hearing the shooting, Grogan and Osborne panicked but were restrained by Moore who produced a gun from inside his jacket. Murphy was at Moore’s side within thirty seconds and quickly enquired the religion of the two eighteen-year-olds in front of him. Immediately on hearing they were Catholics, he shot them both. The four UVF men got into the van and drove back to the Shankill area where the hijacked vehicle was set alight to eliminate fingerprints. The guns used in the operation were handed over to Mr A. for safekeeping.

  At Casey’s Thomas Osborne staggered to his feet with blood spurting from a bullet wound in his neck. He made it to the roadway at Millfield where he stopped a passing car which rushed him to hospital. He was to die three weeks later when an operation was performed to remove a blood clot caused by his wound. Before police were alerted to go to the premises Marie McGrattan’s husband was on his way there to pick up a cash float which his wife had collected from the bank. The cash was intended for Casey’s and for the McGrattan bar, The Brown Horse. When he arrived at Millfield there was no one to be seen in Casey’s yard so he walked into the store where he found Grogan lying dead. He rushed to the upstairs office and, with the assistance of a police constable who had just arrived on the scene, broke down the door. A sickening sight met his eyes. His sister-in-law lay dead in the middle of the room and his wife lay dead behind the door, where she had crawled after she was shot. The money which Marie had told Lenny Murphy didn’t exist was safely hidden in her car in the yard.

  Noel and William Green were apprehended by the police and questioned about the Casey shootings but they refused to reveal the participation of Lenny Murphy or William Moore and, until now, the role played by them has not been known. The first to be arrested was William Green, who broke down under questioning but lied about the part he had played in the murders. He didn’t mention in detail the other players in the drama and stressed constantly that the killings were not planned as part of the operation; instead he claimed the motive was robbery. He told of Marie McGrattan being shot and added: ‘The other fellow turned to the woman and I heard a shot. With the sound of the shot my gun went off and I saw blood spurting just in front of the young, black-haired woman.’ He had the audacity to tell the police that the whole matter sickened him and he couldn’t sleep for weeks. Nothing was further from the truth and the police knew it.

  I obtained a copy of a private statement that William Green intended making when brought to court, in which he emphasized his shock at the shooting and attempted to lessen the role he had played in it. In the statement he refers to the moment when Marie McGrattan was shot and how, on hearing a loud bang which he wasn’t expecting, he ‘sort of jumped’ and his gun went off. He says that on going downstairs he heard more shots just as he was getting into the van. At no time in any statement does he identify the men who were with him on that gruesome day. He says he was ‘sick and giddy’ after the shootings. The only semblance of truth in his account of the incident is contained at the end of his statement where he says that if he had refused to take part in the Casey killings he would have been threatened and forced to participate.

  The truth is that the UVF leadership did not sanction the killings and Murphy did not reveal his true intentions until actually at the scene of the crime. Noel Green, who played a lesser role, told the police he did not know the identity of the men whom he drove to Casey’s. Like his brother, he pretended not to know how many people were shot that day. He claimed he heard a shot and ‘one of the fellas in the van told me that somebody was shot on the job’.

  From all the evidence I have seen and the information I have received from informants, it appears that the only persons apart from Murphy who knew what was intended that day were William Moore, Mr A. and Mr B. William and Noel Green eventually admitted their roles and were convicted. Their fear of Lenny Murphy prevented them naming the others.

  On 2 October there were other examples of how the ‘Big Push’ was being realized. A photographer was killed in his studio on Belfast’s Antrim Road and a woman was killed in a bomb attack on a Catholic-owned bar in the town of Killyleagh in County Down. Elsewhere scores of people were injured in shootings and bombings, with the death toll for the day reaching eleven. That night a four-man UVF team died near Coleraine, when a bomb they were transporting exploded prematurely. The UVF claimed responsibility for the day’s violence and this incensed the Secretary of State who, two days earlier, had pointed out that proscription of the UVF would serve no useful purpose. However, on 3 October, under pressure from others in the Northern Ireland office and members of the mainly Catholic Social and Democratic Labour Party, Merlyn Rees renewed the ban on the UVF. The result was that the new leadership of the organization collapsed at a secret meeting held in the Shankill area on 12 October and the old leadership, with some changes, resumed power. Lenny Murphy by this time had his own unit firmly established and seemed beyond control. He operated as he wished and without fear of retribution either from the new leaders in his own organization or the authorities. He knew that within the UVF and within his own unit he was so feared that no one dared compromise him because of the terrible revenge he would exact on them or their families. He was secure, with Mr A. and Mr B. in position to guard his back, and was confident that the rest of his associates would carry out orders. Within three weeks of the killings in Millfield he was evaluating his strategy for the future. The policy outlined to his men was that, for every Protestant killed, a Catholic should be killed in revenge. He boasted of the terror he would instil in the enemy and expressed his conviction that the ultimate way to kill a man was to cut his throat. He now felt so secure that he could revert to type, to the days of 1972. He believed he was invincible, to the extent that he could publicize to his unit his intentions for the campaign he planned to wage against the other community. He told them that it mattered little who the victims were since all Catholics were ‘scum and Republicans’. Sitting with Murphy one day during an exposition of his inner thoughts was William Moore, who still possessed the tools of his trade in the meat plant; he was aware that these would be of use to Lenny. Also present at the discussion were Mr A., ‘Basher’ Bates, ‘Big Sam’ McAllister, ‘Pretty Boy’ Edwards and ‘Winkie’ Waugh; names which run off the tongue like those given to foot soldiers in a Mafia ‘hit’ squad.

  4

  The Butchery Begins

  The question being asked in the summer of 1972 and in the years leading to 1975 was whether the situation would reach new heights of barbarism. The UVF, UDA, Provisional IRA and Red Hand Commandos had in the past demonstrated again and again their potential for taking human life in a most ruthless fashion, but in 1972 both sides indulged themselves in the most grisly sectarian war of attrition against society yet. Few people stood back and examined the reasons for it but merely expressed sympathy with the condemnations made by politicians and clergy. No one sought to make the point that prejudice in a community invariably leads to anything ranging from ridicule to extermination. Northern Ireland has a society where prejudice is so deeply rooted that extermination rather than derision is the likely outcome when nothing is done to erode it. In most instances the victims of prejudice are not the combatants but the innocent. It is difficult, of course, to eradicate prejudice but serious and concerted attempts should have been made to replace it with tolerance and more positive attitudes within the churches
and the educational system. Few people took the trouble to analyse the factors that contributed to the growing prejudice of the seventies, such as intolerance stemming from the patriotism underlying the two conflicting ideologies, and the literature which supported them. The classic work, The Nature of Prejudice by Gordon W. Allport, defines prejudice in a manner which is relevant to the situation in Northern Ireland: ‘An avertive or hostile attitude towards a person who belongs to a group, simply because he belongs to that group, and is therefore presumed to have the objectionable qualities ascribed to that group.’ He goes on to make the point that this represents an antipathy based on faulty and inflexible generalization.

  A renowned sociologist, Michael MacGreil S.J., made the same point in 1970 when considering this issue. He said that in prejudice there is a double assumption in that, first, the group is presumed to possess the negative qualities ascribed to it without examination and without taking the positive qualities into account. Secondly, the person is presumed to possess these qualities without the slightest effort being made to verify the presumption. In other words, the person and the group are denied a fair chance. According to MacGreil, prejudice is unfair, and is likely to be based on false generalizations.